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Indira Gandhi murder case: An appraisal of
Kehar Singh's judgment
ROSE VARGHESE

1. Introduction
The judicial battle over the life of Kehar Singh and Satwant Singh which created
a sensation throughout the country was set at rest with the execution of the two in the
'Indira Gandhi murder case'. However, the controversies over the verdict of the
Supreme Court still continue. As a matter of fact, many of the issues involved in the
case were complex - whether the trial conducted in the Tihar Jail was justifiable;
how far the guilt of one of the accused was proved "beyond reasonable doubt";
whether the evidence adduced before a Commission of Enquiry could be used as
evidence in the criminal trial? Whether the death sentence awarded to the accused
was in conformity with the prevailing trends in this regard, are some of the questions
which call for a critical appraisal in respect of the decision rendered by the Supreme
Court in Kehar Singh v State (DelhiAdministration/.
The case arose out of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime
Minister of India on 31st October, 1984 by a series of bullets by her security guards
within her residential complex.
The appeal went up to the Supreme Court from the order of the High Court of
Delhi confirming the conviction of the accused. The conviction of Kehar Singh, Balbir
Singh and Satwant Singh was under section 302 read with section 120B, Indian Penal
Code, and Satwant Singh was also convicted under section 120B, section 34 and
section 307, Indian Penal Code, and also under section 27 of the Arms Act. The
fourth person who could have been one of the accuseds in the case, Beant Singh
succumbed to the bullet injuries at the hands of the security personnel.

2. Supreme Court in judgment on facts
The first question which the Supreme Court was confronted with was that of the
power of the court under Article 136 of the Constitution to go into the questions of
fact when there are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the High Court and 'the
Sessions Court. The court took guidance from the law established by the Supreme
Court in some of its previous decisions2 and enumerated the circumstances under
1.
2.

AIR 1988 SC 1883.
The Additional Solicitor General raised the preliminary objection as to the scope of the
appeal. Supporting the argument he cited three cases (1) Prilam Si/lgh v. The Slate AIR 1950 SC
169; (2) Hem Raj v. Slate of Ajmer AIR 1954 SC 462; and (3) Bhogi/lblzai Hirjiblzai v. Slale of
Gujarat AIR 1983 SC 753.
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which the Court sit in appeal on f-acts as well. The Supreme Court pointed out : "It
would be opposed to all principles and precedents if we were to constitute ourselves
into a third court of fact and after reweighing the evidence come to a conclusion
different from that arrived at by the trial judge and the High Court."3
A reference was made to Justice Thakkar's observation:
"A concurrent
established,(1)

finding of fact cannot be reopened

in an appeal

unless it is

that the finding is based on no evidence;

(2) that the finding is perVerse ...
(3) the finding is based and built on inadmissible evidence, which evidence, if
excluded from vision, would negate the prosecution cat;e or substantially
discredit or impair it; or
(4)

some vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the
convict has been overlooked, disregarded or wrongly discarded .•.•

After quoting these observations, the court opined that "the case on hand is one of
such cases and some of the findings of fact reached by the High Court could not be
said to be such which are concurrent or conclusive"s and hence proceeded to examine
the evidence. It may be argued that at this rate there will be no end to litigation and
going again into evidence is time consuming. However, when a judge in an appeal
under Article 136 is confronted with a situation of this kind, where if convicted, capital
punishment
would be awarded, the court ought not to give significance to
technicalities. To the court it may only be a matter of delay and inconvenience but to
the accused it is a matter of life and death. Hence it is difficult to reconcile with the
preliminary objection in the case and it is a commendable step taken by the Supreme
Court in having gone into the correctness of the findings of fact.

3. In camera trial in criminal cases
The next controversy was centred round Article 21 of the Constitution. In the
instant case the Delhi High Court ordered the Sessions Trial to be held in the Tihar
.J ail. One of the main contentions
of the appellant was that the procedure for criminal
trial as put forward by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 demanded an
open trial.6 Taking into account the law and order situation and the political
significance of the crime 7 the Delhi High Court issued an order appointing a judge
to try the accuseds at a place other than the usual place of sitting of a court. This
was one of the major objections of the defence and therefore calls for an evaluation of
the essential requirements of a valid trial which were thus8 formulated by the court:

(i) Whether the High Court has power to direct the trial of the case at a place
other than the normal seat of the Court of Session?

3.
4.
5,
6,
7,
8.

As per Fazal Ali, J, in AIR 1950 SC 169a's quoted in AIR 1988 SC 1883 ,at p. 1948.
AIR 1983 SC 753.
AIR 1988 SC 1883at p. 1903.
Section 327(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973.
For details see AIR 1988 SC 1883,pp. 1935-1936.
AIR 1988 SC 1883,per K Jagannatha Shelly, J, at p. 1930.
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(ii) Whether the trial inside the jail premises is the very antithesis of an open trial?
(iii) Whether

the trial proceedings
constitute a public trial? and

were devoid of sufficient

safeguards

to

(iv) Whether the court's refusal to call for the statements made by certain
prosecution witnesses before the Thakkar Commission was justified?
So also, one-o[the major objections of the defence was that it was not necessary for
the High C0l!.rt to allot the assassination case to a particular judge.9 For an analysis of
this dispute it is necessary to take a look at section 194 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.10The last part of the section clearly indicates that the High Court is
authori~ed to allbt a case to a particular judge. Further; the High Court in this case
directed that the trial lias to be held in Tihar Jail. This notificationll was urged to be
wholly bad and arbitrary. On a literal interpretation of the section1l it is clear that the
High Court only has jurisdiction to specify the place or places where ordinarily a
Court of Session may sit So far as any particular place is to be taken, it is only
permissible under the second sub· clause with the consent of parties and that decision
has to be taken by the trial court itself. The Supreme Court has justified the action by
saying that the said notification13 of the High Court could be taken to be that Tihar
Jail is also one of the places where ordinarily a Sessions Court could hold its sittings.
Is this factually correct? The Supreme Court says, "In this view of the matter, there is
no error if the sessions trial is held in Tihar Jail after such a notification has been
issued by the High Court,,14 i.e. in addition to Tis Hazari and New Delhi where the
Sessions Court ordinarily hold its sittings. It is rather surprising how the High Court
,could attempes to draw from the proviso such a conclusion and that too based on a
local amendment of Uttar Pradesh.16 In any case that is 110t a State amendment
applicable to Delhi, If foreseeing the difficulty Uttar Pradesh has amended the
provision why not amend section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure itself to add
that "the, Court of Sessions may hold, or the High Court may direct the Court of
Sessions, to hold its sitting in any particular place at any place in the Sessions division,
where it appears expedient to do so for considerations of internal security or public
order and in such cases the consent of the prosecution and the accused shall not be
necessary"1? - and thus in tune with the Uttar Pradesh amendment.
Another dispute which arose is whether the sitting of the court in the jail will
make it devoid of the principle of 'openness' of the trial. The' terminology of the
9.
10.

11.

The High Court issued a J/01ification under section 194 Code of Criminal Procedure, ordering Shri
Mahesh Chandra, Addl.1Sessions Judge, New Delhi to try the case.
Section 194, Code of Criminal Procedure,
reads: "An Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant
Sessions Judge shall try such cases as the Sessions Judge of the division may, by general or special
order, make over to him for trial or as the High Court may, by special order, direct him to try."

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Datedof May
10, 1985
issued
the C6de of Criminal Procedure, directing that the
trial
the said
case be
held under
in the section
Central 9(6)
Jail,Qf
'fihar.
See section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Supra n. 11.
AIR 1988 SC 1883 at p. 1896.
Ibid. at p. 1895.
See 'State Amendments'
following section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (V.P. Act
16 of 1976, section 2).

17.

Ibid.
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relevant sectionlS makes it clear that "even if a trial is held in a private house or is held
inside the jailor anywhere no sooner it becomes a venue of trial of a criminal case it
is deemed to be in law an open place".19Any member of the public could go and
attend the proceedings in an open criminal court, subject to the accommodation
facilities of. the court room. However, the question as to whether the restrictions
imposed on the public to be witness to the deliberations of the court will make it an in
camera proceeding calls for further clarification. The proviso to section 327(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 justifies the restricted entries to the 'open court
room' to the general public. Such restrictions imposed by the Judge or the Magistrate
will not change the character of the trial. Apart from the statutory justification the
court proceeded to establish its stand by other judicial pronouncements.lO Though
none of the cases referred to by the Supreme Court had a persuasive value, it
managed to establish a point which was evolved by the Supreme Court in Naresh
Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra.21 The court reiterated the principle that
public trial of cases is a means to ensure fair administration of justice, which is the
end of the judicial process. Hence, if there is a conflict between these two - the
means and the end - the former has to be regulated in the interest of the
administration of justice. This view of the Supreme Court appears to be hazy and
varied interpretations are possible. However, the final word of the Supreme Court on
this point in the instant case was that public trial or trial in open court is the rule. But
in cases where the ends of justice would be defeated if the trial is held in public, the
court has inherent powers to hold the trial in camera.22 Another justification for
validating the trial in jail is the necessity of the presiding judge having full control of
the Court House. A further justification is that the accused must have all facilities to
have a fair trial and all safeguards to avoid prejudice. Here the Supreme Court rightly,
observed that the fact that the case was held at Tihar Jail, where everyone had the
right to attend, it was deemed to be an 'open place' in law. Just because restrictions
were imposed to regulate entry by way of security measures, it does not cease to be
open.

4. Thakkar inquiry and evidentiary issues
The next point which calls for attention in connection with fairness of the trial is
whether the refusal by the cQ~rt to call for the statements made by certain witnesses
before the Thakkar Commission23 to establish the innocence of the accused was
justified or not. Soon after the assassination of Smt. Gandhi the Government of India
appointed a Commission to investigate, recommend and report on matters relating to
the case.24 The Commission submitted its report25 to the Government but due to a

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Section 327{1).
AIR 1988 SC 1883 at p. 1897.
For details see, ibid, pp. 1917-1920and 1934-1935.
AIR 1967 SC 1.
AIR 1988 SC 1883 at p. 1920.
Appointed on November 20. 1984 under the Commission of Enquiry Act. 1952 with Mr. Justice
M.P. Thakkar as the Chairman.
See AIR 1988 SC 1883,pp. 1898 and 1899 and 1942.
Two reports - one on November 19,1985 and the other on February 27,1986.
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change in the la~ relating to the publication of the reports, Thakkar Commission
report was kept as confidential. The counsel for the accused prayed,Jor the copy of
the report as they could avail of the material which they could use to build up their
defence. On the contrary, the Additional Solicitor General argued before the court
thllt a witness who is examined before the Commission is protected and the statements
made before the Commission could not be used against the witness for any purpose in
any other proceedings either civil or criminal. Further, he argued that due to the
amendment in the Commission of Enquiry Act and the consequential notification
issued by the Government it made the report confidential and even the Parliament had
no right to see the report and, therefore, neither the report nor the statements made
before the Commission could be asked for by the accused for the purpose of trial.
Sections 145, 155(3) and 157 of the Evidence Act deal'with the provisions which
J?ermit the use of a previous statement of a witness in a subsequent trial, and even if
permitted, for what purpose such statements could be used. The two purposes
according to the court are:
(1) 'for cross-examination and contradiction; and
(2) for corroboration.

As far as section 6 of the Commission of Enquiry Act is concerned, there are two
restrictions27 possible' on the use of a statement by a witness before the Commission.
'The Supreme Court upheld the stand taken by the High Court that, from the nature
of section 6 of the Commission of Enquiry Act it is evident that the statement made
by any person before the Commission is wholly inadmissible in evidence in any
subsequent judicial proceeding.
The High Court followed the Supreme Court's decision in R:K. Dalmia v. Justic.e
Tendolka?B though the direct question involved was not the scope of section '6 of the
Commission of Enquiry Act. The observation in that case was reiterated by the
Supreme Court,"... the Commission of Enquiry has no judicial powers and its reports will purely be
recommendatory and not effective proprio vigore and the statement made by any
person before the Commission of Enquiry is under section 6 of the Act wholly
inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal"29 (Emphasis
supplied)"
26.

27.
28.
29.

As per section 6 of the Commission of Enquiry Act, a report submitted by the Commission had to
be laid before the House of the People within 6 months of the submission of the Report by the
Commission. However, the Government did not do so. Instead steps were taken to amend the Act.
The amendment was brought about by an Ordinance dated May 14. 1986 introducing sub-sections
(5) and (6) to section 3, to the effect that, if the Government is satisfied that it is not expedient in
the interest of the security of the State and in public interest to lay the report before the House of
the People or State Assembly it could do so. The Ordinance was replaced subsequently by an
Amendment Act (Act. No. 36 of 1986) with retrospective effect.
'
Section 6 of the Commission of Enquiry Act reads: "No 'statement made by any person in the
course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in any
civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement."
AIR 1958 SC 538.
AIR 1988 SC 1883 at p. 1944.
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Jagannatha Shetty, J; elaborately discussed the provisions relating to making
objections for using of the depositions before the Commission or the report of the
Commission in subsequent judicial proceedings.30 The court recognized that the
construction of section 6 of the Commission of Enquiry Act as accepted by the High
Court was proper.

S. Appraisal of evidence on conspiracy and murder
The most controversial issue during the pendency of the case and which
continues to be a question of dispute is as to the persons involved in the assassination
of Smt. Indira Gandhi. The First Information Report was based on the vivid
statement of Narain Singh, a Head Constable deputed on duty at Smt. Indira
Gandhi's residence. He was accompanying her at the time of shooting and claimed to
be a witness of occurrence. He had stated as follows:
"When we were about 10-11 feet away from the gate of 1, Safdarjung Road and
1, Akbar Road, I noticed Beant Singh, Sub-Inspector on duty at TMC gate and
in the adjoining sentry booth constable Satwant Singh, 2nd Bn, in uniform armed
with a stengun was on duty. When Smt. Indira Gandhi reached near the sentry
booth, Beant Singh, Sub-Inspector took out his service revolver from his right dub
and immediately started firing bullets at Smt. Indira Gandhi. At the same time
constable Satwant Singh also fired shots at Smt. Indira Gandhi with his stengun.
As a result of firing of bullets at the hands of the aforesaid two persons Smt.
Indira Gandhi sustained injuries on her front and fell down on the ground."3'
The evidence of Narain Singh received full corroboration from the other two eye
witnesses.32Beant Singh and Satwant Singh had also sustained bullet injuries at the
hands of ITBP personnel. Satwant Singh was arrested after his discharge from the
hospital. Beant Singh dieq as a result of injuries sustained by him. Balbir Singh, a subinspector posted for security duty at Smt. Gandhi's office was also arrested. It is said
that certain incriminating material was found on his person when searched at the time
of his arrest. Kehar Singh, an -uncle of Beant Singh was also arrested. He is said to
have made a statement on December 3, 1984 in pursuance of which some
incriminating articles were seized at his house and from a place pointed out by him.
The prosecution case33at the trial was that in June 1984 the armed forces of the
Indian Union took action which is described generally as "Operation Bluestar" under
which armed forces personnel entered the Golden Temple complex at Amritsar, and
cleared it of the terrorists. In this operation it is alleged that there was loss of life and
properties as well as damage amongst other things to the Akal Takht in the Golden
Temple Complex. As a result of this Operation the religious feelings of the members
of the Sikh community were greatly offended. According to the prosecution all the four
accused persons mentioned their resentment openly and held Smt. Gandhi responsible
for the action taken at Amritsar. This resentment led them ultimately to the incident of
30.

31.

Ibid. at pp. 1942-1948.
AIR 1988 SC 1BB3at p. 1961

32.

Rameshwar

33.

AIR 1988 SC 1883 at p. 1$92.

Dayal and N~thu Ram.
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October 31, 1984 and to become parties to a criminal conspiracy to commit an illegal
act namely the murder ofSmt. Indira Gandhi. Hence, there was a motive for the crime.
The charge sheet is that the accused Kehar Singh, a religiolls fanatic, after the
'Operation Bluestar' converted Beant Singh and through him Satwant Singh to
religious bigotry, and made them undergo 'Amrit Chhakna Ceremony' on October 14,
1984. He also took Beant Singh to the Golden Temple on October 20, 1984 where
Satwant Singh was to join them as part of the mission. The charge is that Balbir Singh
was also planning to commit the murder and discussed his plans with Beant Singh and
also prompted Satwant Singh to commit -lhe murder and discussed the matter with
him on October 30, 1984. All the same, as regards Balbir Singh's guilt, the Supreme
Court held that there was no evidence at all to establish even prima facie his
participation in the conspiracy, hence he was acquitted.
Therefore the entire criticism is centred round the conviction of Kehar Singh that there was no proper evidence of the fact that he engaged in a conspiracy. The
offence of conspiracy is generally as the court rightly put it "hatched in secrecy".
Hence very often the court will be bound to rely upon circumstantial evidence.
Paragraphs 77 to 86 of the judgment34 highlight in explicit terms the role of Kehar
Singh as a co-conspirator in the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi as is brought out
by the material evidence of P.W. 65, Bimal Khalsa, wife of Beant Singh. Nobody had a
case that she had any grudge against anybody.
Several important
For instance,-

circumstances

emerged from the testimonYS of Bimal Khalsa.

(1) Kehar Singh's frequent visits to Beant Singh's house after the 'Operation
Bluestar';
(2} his close and continued association and secret talks with him on several
occasions about the destruction of the Akal Takht in the Golden Temple
complex;
(3)

another relevant fact that they stopped the conversation
Singh's wife entered;

(4)

Beant Singh's visit to Gurudwara
having taken Amrit;

(5) later she was sent to Gurudwara
wife to take Amrit there;

whenever

Beant

at the instance of Kehar Singh and he
Sis Ganj along with Kehar Singh and his

(6) Beant Singh's statement that he would become a 'Shaheed' and she should
look after: the children;
(7) Kehar Singh keeping the gold 'kara' and 'ring' of Beant Singh; an<t
(8)

34.
35.

on one occasion Kehar Singh locked himself up with Beant Singh on the
roof of the latter's hOllse where they spoke in whispers and later they were
joined by Satwant Singh and the discussion was followed by meals: When

Ibid at pp. 1912-1914.
Ibid.
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Beant Singh's wife enquired what they were whispering about, Kehar Singh
replied that it was about asking somebody to take Amrit. When she then.
enquired why it was being kept a secret from her, Kehar Singh became
silent but later complained to her husband about her having questioned him.
(9) Beant Singh's familyvisit to Amritsar with Kehar Singh and his wife.There the
two of them went to see the Akal Takht and refused to take the wives along.
So also, there was further corroboration in his post-crime conduct also. It came
out in evidence that immediately after Smt. Gandhi's murder Kehar Singh's remark
was "whosoever would take confrontation with the Panth, he would .meet the same
fate".36All the~e circumstances serve as clinching evidence against him and indicate
that Kehar Singh was a co-conspirator to assassinate Smt. Gandhi.
In this connection, it is necessary to note that all the three courts, the Trial
Court, the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court concurrently held that Kehar
Singh was very much involved in and guilty of the charge of conspiracy. The verdicts
were all unanimous.
The court has rightly held that a prima facie case of conspiracy has to be
established for application of section 10 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It is well settled
that an act of one of the accused cannot be used as evidence against the other. But an
exception has been carved out in section 10 in cases of conspiracy. However, the
second part operates only when the first part of the section is clearly established i.e.
there should be reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have
conspired in the language of section 120A of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions
Court as well as the High Court accepted the prosecution version and "held that the
conspiracy to assassinate Smt. Indira Gandhi was hatched out by all the three persons
i.e. Kehar Singh, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh,,?7 The Supreme Court after a
revie~ of the evidence relating to Kehar Singh's connections with the assassination
plot, concluded that his activities before the commission of the crime and his post-:
crime conduct taken along with other material evidence on record were stronger as
evidence of guilt than even direct testimony.
The court, illler alia, discussed and distinguished criminal conspiracy and
abetment in conspiracy. It is a well settled position in law that 'it conspirator who has
not actually committed the offence but has conspired can be sentenced for committing
that offence. To that extent the court brought to light the fact that the law of
conspiracy in India is simjlar to that in England in that an overt act is inessential when
the conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. The court said~enteriDg i!1toan
agreement by two or more persons to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is
the very quintessence of the~ffence of conspiracy.
In fact, Balbir Singh was convicted' by the Trial Court and the High Court and
his acquittal by the Supreme Court exposes the extent to which utmost care and
caution was taken by the courts in considering eviden~, and in the matter of proving
conspiracy, where the benefit of doubt was given to him.
36.
37.
38.

Ibid at p, 1914.
Ibid at p. 1958.
Ibid at pp. 1958-1962.
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6. Was death penalty warranted?
Another major criticism which is being levelled against the decision rendered in
Kehar Singh's case is with regard to the sentence. Whether death sentence itself is
constitutionally valid was dealt with at length in Bacchan Singh v. State of Pllnjab39•
Ther-e the court laid down that it should be awarded only in the "rarest of rare cases"
where there were no extenuating circumstances. In Machhi Singh v. State of Pllnjab40
the court again indicated as to what constitutes "the rarest of rare cases" which
warrant the imposition of death sentence.
The significant factor in the instant case does not lie in the fact that the Prime
Minister of India has been murdered but in the fact that when persons in whom confidence has been reposed take advantage of their situation by assassinating an unarmed
person who entrusted her life and security in their hands, it is nothing but sheer betrayal.
Whoever has taken the drastic step and whoever has abetted and conspired in the same
ought not to escape the stringent sentence. For such cruel, merciless and egregious
crimes, capital punishment should find a place in the Code. Even from the point of view
of Prime Ministership, a leader may take various steps which mayor may not be equally
acceptable to all members of a community. Ours is a democratic republic. We have a
commitment to our Constitution. As Oza, J, rightly put it "in our country we have
adopted and accepted a system wherein change of the leader is permissible by ballot and
not by bullet".4l Beant Singh and Satwant Singh were posted on the security duty of the
Prime Minister. They are there to protect her from any intruder and if they themselves
mercilessly attack her with a series of bullets, how can they seek sympathy in sentence?
Here as the courts rightly observed "there appears to be no reason or no mitigating
circumstance for consideration on the question of sentence".42 So also, observed'3 by
the court, "the Operation Bluestar was not directed to cause damage to Akal Takht.
Nor was it intended to hurt the religious feelings of Sikhs. The decision was taken by a
responsible and responsive Government in the national interest". For this the Prime
Minister ought not to have been made the target for the consequences of the decision.
Assuming for argument sake that her step hurt the religious feelings of Sikhs. even so. was
there no other alternative for the redressal of their grievance but to take away her life?
Even today, the criticism against the verdict continues. However, Justice Shetty's
succinct observation demonstrates the extent to which the judges44 aimed at fair play
in the case in the best traditions of the legal profession. He rightly observed:
"It is a matter of great importance to the people of this country that the
accused be lawfully tried and lawfully 'convicted ur acquitted. A wrongful
conviction or a wrongful acquittal may shake the confidel1c~ of the people in
our justice delivery system:,45

* * * *
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

AIR 1980 SC 898.
AtR 1983 SC 957.
AtR 1988 SC 1883 at p. 1915.
Ibid at p. 1916.
Ibid at p. 1888 ..
G.L. Oza, B.c. Ray and K. Jagannalha
AIR 1988SC 1883 at p. 1928.

Shelly. JJ.

